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Notes
BAD CHILDREN OR A BAD SYSTEM: PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL
INTERPRETATION OF A DELINQUENT'S PRIOR RECORD IN
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A
DISCRETIONARY JUDICIAL WAIVER
I. INTRODUCTION
Two children, both fifteen years old, are charged with a crime. One
child is tried as a juvenile and receives a five-year sentence in a juvenile
facility that has extensive rehabilitation and counseling programs.' The
other child, tried as an adult on the same charge, is sentenced to serve
fifteen years in prison and forever branded with the stigma of being a
convicted felon.2 Seem fair? Hardly. Nevertheless, as the federal system
currently stands, two juveniles with similar records and backgrounds, fac-
1. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Correction/
Detention (Nov. 21, 2004), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/search/TopicList.asp
(listing available rehabilitation and counseling programs in juvenile justice sys-
tem); see also ROBERT D. HOGE, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER: THEORY, RESEARCH AND
APPLICATIONS 200-22, 226-52 (2001) (detailing various treatment strategies used
for juvenile rehabilitation); Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Crimi-
nal Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81, 139-41, 142-43 (2000) (detailing differ-
ences between juvenile and adult institutions including staff sizes, educational
programs, facility organization and inmates' own perceptions and attitudes to-
wards being treated in adult or juvenile facility). These strategies address social,
emotional and behavioral problems that underlie delinquent behavior in the
hopes of successfully rehabilitating a child. See HOGE, supra, at 222-23 (summariz-
ing available judicial sanctions for juvenile offenders).
2. See Catherine R. Guttman, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer
Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 529 (1995) (noting that
juveniles in adult prison are not rehabilitated, but often develop into "career
criminals"). See generally Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An
Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
371 (1998) (examining types of transfers and ramifications of transfer in states'
juvenile justice systems). The commentator asserts that transfer is the wrong solu-
tion for juvenile crime because it fails to achieve any of the goals that justify its
existence. See id. at 401 (stating transfers are "merely a quick fix" to juvenile crime
and not real solution). Transfer, in the commentator's view, may be the wrong
solution because of the failure to swiftly sanction juveniles after they commit a
crime, the high rate of recidivism among juveniles who were transferred, the loss
of rehabilitative opportunities and the effects of being incarcerated with adults.
See id. at 402-05 (elaborating on why transfer is wrong solution to juvenile crime);
see also JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY:. A SOCIOLEGAL COM-
MENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 127-216 (1998) (discussing impact that
interaction with law may have on juvenile's life).
(227)
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ing similar charges, may be tried differently because of problems with dis-
cretionary waivers between juvenile and criminal courts.3
Why does this happen? Because of a discrepancy in the interpreta-
tion of waiver factors under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(FJDA), 4 juveniles facing a discretionary judicial waiver are receiving dif-
ferential treatment from district court judges. 5 A juvenile entering the
federal system faces several procedural possibilities: automatic transfer to
criminal court by statute, adjudication in the juvenile justice system or dis-
cretionary judicial waiver to criminal court, resulting in the youth being
tried as an adult. 6 In the third scenario, a significant problem arises be-
cause judges have the exclusive authority to send ajuvenile to the criminal
system based on six subjective factors. 7 The larger issue, however, is that
the meaning of one of these six factors-"prior delinquency record"-is
3. See generally Bradley T. Smith, Comment, Interpreting "Prior Record" Under the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1431 (2000) (examining federal
approach to juvenile waivers and ultimately supporting broad interpretation of
"prior delinquency record"); Randie P. Ullman, Note, Federal Juvenile Waiver Prac-
tices: A Contextual Approach to the Consideration of Prior Delinquency Records, 68 FoRD-
HAM L. REv. 1329 (2000) (examining federal approach to juvenile waivers and
ultimately deciding that increasing subjectivity of waiver decision is best solution).
Both of these articles examine the same problem addressed in this Note, but reach
a different conclusion. Compare Smith, supra, at 1460 (concluding that expansive
interpretation of "prior delinquency record" is proper), with Ullman, supra, at
1368 (concluding that all prior police contact should be considered). Although a
uniform solution is not agreed upon, all of these articles call for a reform of the
current discretionary waiver process as a way of increasing the effectiveness of the
federal juvenile justice system. See Smith, supra, at 1460 (concluding certain con-
duct should be excluded for waiver purposes even though currently admissible);
Ullman, supra, at 1368 (urging federal courts to adopt uniform definition of "prior
delinquency record" for increased effectiveness).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2004) (establishing waiver factors for juveniles under
federal jurisdiction).
5. 5. See Guttman, supra note 2, at 534-41 (using state waiver examples to
illustrate possible reasons for differential treatment including judicial interpreta-
tional problems with statutes, racial biases, misuse of psychological evaluations and
failure to listen to youthful offender). For a further discussion of the differential
treatment juveniles are receiving under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(FJDA), see infra notes 124-64 and accompanying text.
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (enumerating possibilities for where juvenile will face
charges).
7. See id. (elaborating on discretionary power district courtjudges hold during
waiver hearings due to findings made "in the interest ofjustice"). The six statutory
factors that a judge considers for the purpose of a discretionary waiver under the
FJDA are:
[1] the age and social background of the juvenile; [2] the nature of the
alleged offense; [3] the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delin-
quency record; [4] the juvenile's present intellectual development and
psychological maturity; [5] the nature of past treatment efforts and the
juvenile's response to such efforts; [6] the availability of programs de-
signed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
[Vol. 50: p. 227
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unclear.8 Judges assess a juvenile's "prior delinquency record" when mak-
ing discretionary waiver decisions. 9 Nonetheless, no uniform interpreta-
tion of this factor exists.10 Consequently, the lack ofjudicial uniformity in
applying the waiver factors often results in wide variations in the outcomes
of waiver hearings. I I The resulting impact of this judicial discretionary
waiver has a staggering effect on a juvenile's life; therefore, an accurate,
uniform and consistent interpretation of the FJDA discretionary waiver
factors is of critical importance.
12
This Note examines the circuit split over the interpretation of federal
discretionary judicial waiver factors, specifically analyzing the various inter-
pretations of "prior delinquency record."1 8 Part II explores the origins of
the juvenile justice system through historical, judicial and legislative back-
ground. 14 Part III examines the mechanisms for juvenile waiver in the
federal court system.' 5 Part IV analyzes the circuit split assessing "prior
delinquency record" for discretionary waiver purposes.1 6 Part V argues
that narrowly construing the meaning of "prior delinquency record" is the
8. See United States v.Juvenile Male, 336 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2003) (not-
ing current circuit split as to what constitutes juvenile's "prior delinquency re-
cord"), overruled by United States v. Doe, 366 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004)
(overruling Juvenile Male on question other than meaning of "prior delinquency
record"). On appeal from a district court order to transfer to adult status, the
defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by considering
unadjudicated arrests as part of his "prior delinquency record" for waiver pur-
poses. See id. at 1111 (elaborating on defendant's claims). In reversing the deci-
sion on other grounds, the court noted the circuit split on the issue of whether to
consider unadjudicated charges as part of ajuvenile's delinquency record, but did
not weigh in on the issue. See id. at 1112 (stating reluctance of court to address
issue without possessing juvenile's record). See generally Smith, supra note 3 (exam-
ining lack of clarity in FJDA discretionary waiver factors); Ullman, supra note 3
(same).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (listing six statutory factors judges use to determine
whether discretionary judicial waiver to criminal system is appropriate). For a fur-
ther discussion of the six statutory factors, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the lack of uniformity in interpretation, see
infra notes 124-203 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the circuit split and lack of uniformity in the
application of discretionary judicial waiver, see infra notes 124-64 and accompany-
ing text.
12. Seegenerally HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS
AND VIcTIms: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT (1999) [hereinafter REPORT] (providing gen-
eral statistical evidence of juveniles involved with crime and resulting impact on
their lives). For a further discussion on the potential impact that waiver may have
on the quality of a juvenile's life, see infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the circuit split over the meaning of "prior
delinquency record," see infra notes 124-64 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the historical, judicial and legislative back-
ground of the juvenile justice system, see infra notes 19-95 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the FJDA and an explanation of the mechanics
of the waiver process in the federal system, see infra notes 96-123 and accompany-
ing text.
16. For a further discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 124-64 and
accompanying text.
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most practical and constitutionally sound interpretation., 7 Finally, Part VI
asserts that Congress needs to further define the discretionary waiver fac-
tors so that judges will apply a uniform federal standard, thereby maintain-
ing the integrity of the juvenile justice system.' 8
II. BACKGROUND
To fully grasp the potential impact of the FJDA on present and future
cases, one must first understand how and why a separate juvenile justice
system developed.' 9 This part of the Note explains the emergence of the
separate juvenile justice system, the major United States Supreme Court
cases that shaped juvenile justice and relevant federal juvenile justice
legislation. 2
0
A. Emergence of a Separate Juvenile Justice System
Juveniles were not always viewed as requiring special attention and
care in the criminal justice system. 2 1 Until the nineteenth century, the
American legal system treated juvenile offenders the same way as hard-
ened adult criminals. 22 In fact, in the late eighteenth century, children as
young as seven years old could face trial in criminal court, receive the
same punishments as adults, including the possibility of a death sentence,
and serve time in the same prisons as adults. 23
Changing social climates in the nineteenth century, however, fueled a
metamorphism of the criminal system.2 4 Rapid industrialization, modern-
ization and urbanization produced massive social upheaval and change in
the American social structure.2 5 Cities were viewed as criminal breeding
17. For a further discussion'on the merits of using a narrow interpretation,
see infra notes 165-203 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of policy considerations and the need for further
legislative guidance, see infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of why a separate juvenile justice system devel-
oped, see infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the history of the juvenile justice system, juve-
nile case law and related federal legislation, see infra notes 21-95 and accompany-
ing text.
21. 21. SeeWATKINS, supra note 2, at 3-4 (discussing early treatment of adoles-
cents and their relationship to legal system).
22. See MARGARET C. JASPER, JUVENILEJUSTICE AND CHILDREN'S LAw 1-3 (2001)
(discussing English roots ofjuvenile justice system); see also Ullman, supra note 3, at
1331 (discussing early nineteenth century treatment ofjuveniles). Because the ju-
venile and adult populations were not segregated in prison,juveniles were housed
with older and more seasoned adult criminals. See Ullman, supra note 3, at 1331
(noting juvenile prison conditions).
23. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 86 (discussing legal conditions for children
in early America). Children as young as seven who committed crimes were
thought to possess a criminal mind. See id. (noting belief that children older than
seven were presumed capable of criminal intent).
24. See id. at 86-92 (providing overview of history ofjuvenile justice system).
25. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Pinciple of the Offense: Legisla-
tive Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 474
[Vol. 50: p. 227
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss2/4
grounds. 26 As a result, this turbulent social climate spawned the Progres-
sive movement, which attempted to combat the many problems accompa-
nying modernization. 2 7
The Progressive movement viewed children as innocent and corrupti-
ble beings who simply required guidance and care to develop properly.
28
Furthermore, reformers viewed children as products of their environ-
ments. 29 Because Progressives believed that environmental factors were
instrumental in creating either criminals or model citizens, they reasoned
that juvenile crime could be controlled if children had stability in their
homes.30
Reforming the juvenile justice system to provide adolescents with spe-
cial care became one of the Progressives' earliest social reforms.3 1 Under-
standing that the existing juvenile justice system did not solve the
problems of juvenile crime, these reformers pushed for the development
of a flexible system that embodied the concept of the state exercising
guardianship over troubled children.3 2 The idea of the state acting as
guardian is referred to as parens patriae the government assumes the role
of the juvenile's guardian to ensure the child's best interests are
protected. 33
(1987) (noting that modernization created new concept of family and childhood).
See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELIN-
QUENCY 28-60 (1969) (detailing historical development of separate juvenile justice
system through evaluation of social, legal and economic reforms).
26. See PLATr, supra note 25, at 36 (noting nineteenth century perception that
city environment turned children into criminals).
27. See Klein, supra note 2, at 375-77 (describing Progressive movement's phi-
losophy and drive to reform juvenile justice system). See generally PLATr, supra note
25 (detailing development of Progressive movement).
28. See PLATr, supra note 25, at 36-43 (discussing philosophy of Progressive
movement and resulting impact philosophy had on development of their juvenile
justice ideals); see also Feld, supra note 25, at 473-79 (giving detailed historical
background of Progressive movement).
29. See PLATr, supra note 25, at 43-44 (summarizing important developments
in ideology relating to criminals). Some of the important developments towards
the end of the century included the birth of the idea that delinquency was of a
temporary and reversible nature if properly treated. See id. at 45 (summarizing
beliefs of reformers). During this same time period, professional penal institutes
emerged. See id. at 44 (noting rise of professional class of penal administrators).
30. See id. at 43 (discussing Progressive ideology and beliefs about criminals
being "made" as opposed to born).
31. See BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE
JUVENILE COURTS 8-17 (1993) (providing detailed history of Progressives' philoso-
phy and justice reformation goals); see also ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL
CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS AND THE RISE OF JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE
ERA AMERIcA 2 (1998) (noting role that females played in social reforms).
32. See CLAPP, supra note 31, at 3, 133-36 (noting recognized need for reform
and early developments ofjuvenile court movement); see also WATKINS, supra note
2, at 17-23 (discussing general idea of parens patriae).
33. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 9 (noting adoption of English parens patriae
idea by American court system). Parens patriae is defined by Black's Law Dictionary
as "[t] he state regarded as sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protec-
20051 NOTE
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Under the theory of parens patriae, the Progressive movement intro-
duced a number of changes to the criminal justice system that focused on
highly flexible and informal policies of rehabilitation for juveniles.3 4 The
new juvenile legal reforms had an informal air-judges were not simply
there to punish, but to be a child's helpful friend.3 5 Reforms included
separating children from adults in prison, specially tailored treatment for
children, limiting public access to juvenile proceedings, adjudicating a
child "delinquent" instead of "guilty" and trying children at informal pro-
ceedings without a jury.36 In fact, these informal proceedings were not
thought of as criminal, but rather civil proceedings that did not require
the full constitutional protections required in parallel criminal proceed-
ings.3 7 Thus, as the juvenile justice system matured in the 1900s, it devel-
oped with the distinct notion of doing what was in the "best interest of the
child."3
8
tion to those unable to care for themselves." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1144 (8th
ed. 2004).
34. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 17-19 (examining prehistory of juvenile
courts under English doctrine of parens patriae). The concept of parens patriae led
to new policies of transfer and new rehabilitation processes. See id. at 19-24 (ex-
plaining transformation of ideology into legal reforms).
35. See CLAPP, supra note 31, at 19 (retelling story of first day ofjuvenile court
in Chicago).
36. See PLA-r, supra note 25, at 137 (listing development of new procedures
unique to juvenile justice system); WATKINS, supra note 2, at 31, 46-50 (examining
new theories and procedures); see also REPORT, supra note 12, at 85-89 (noting
general historical changes).
37. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1967) (discussing procedural develop-
ment of juvenile justice system and its unique place in judicial system). In chal-
lenging the traditional juvenile justice system, the Court noted, "proceedings
involving juveniles were described as 'civil' not 'criminal' and therefore not subject
to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his
liberty." Id. at 17.
38. See Feld, supra note 25, at 477 (explaining vision of ideal juvenile court as
providing individualized treatment for offenders to best serve their needs). Ex-
perts hoped that courts would be able to tailor care for each youth based on evalu-
ations of each child's personality. See id. (explaining hope that system would fit
children's needs on case-by-case basis). Reformers of the juvenile justice system
hoped to "personalize" justice for children so that judges were fully informed
before a child appeared in court for adjudication. See PLATr, supra note 25, at
142-44 (describing judicial relationship to juvenile offender and flexibility ofjuve-
nile justice system). As one judge in an early Indianapolis court said of personal-
izedjustice, "it is the personal touch that does it .... [I]f I could get close enough
to [the juvenile offender] to put my hand on his head and shoulder, or my arm
around him, in nearly every case I could get his confidence." See id. at 143 n.21
(citation omitted); see also Franklin E. Zimring & Jeffrey Fagan, Transfer Policy and
Law Reform, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLES-
CENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 412-13 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds.,
2000) [hereinafter CHANCING BORDERS] (discussing modem problems accompany-
ing notion of "best interest").
[Vol. 50: p. 227
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Flowing from the Progressives' reforms, the first juvenile court
opened in 1899 with an emphasis on informal proceedings. 39 Within ten
years of the firstjuvenile court opening, twenty-two other states developed
juvenile legal systems separate from the criminal system. 40 By 1920, al-
most every state had some type of separate juvenile justice system in
place.4 1
As the juvenile court system developed in a unique manner, the pro-
cedural formalities of the criminal courtroom faded.4 2 The juvenile jus-
tice system's rejection of traditional standards of jurisprudence
encouraged judges to use non-legal resources, such as background reports
from social workers and mental health evaluations performed by psycholo-
gists, when making their determinations. 43 The informal nature of the
proceedings also granted broad latitude to judges and imposed few set
guidelines in the decision-making process, including the process for dis-
cretionary judicial waiver to criminal court.4 4
The power to waive juvenile proceedings to criminal court was availa-
ble from the inception of the juvenile justice system. 4 5 Even at the early
stages of its development, however, juvenile waiver proceedings were
plagued with problems because no uniform standard was in place to deter-
mine when a child should face charges as an adult in criminal court.
46
Without formal guidelines and criteria to make these determinations,
39. See CLAPP, supra note 31, at 19-21 (describing Chicago court and influ-
ence local women's club had on reforms).
40. See id. at 133 (noting increase in juvenile-specific laws and courts).
41. See id. (noting widespread impact of Progressive movement's reforms).
42. See PLAT-r, supra note 25, at 143-45 (explaining that ideal juvenile court
setting for Progressives should not resemble traditional criminal courthouse). In
addition to the proceedings being less formal, the actual juvenile courtroom's at-
mosphere was more like a living room rather than a criminal courtroom. See id. at
143-44 (explaining that ideal juvenile courthouse should look "more like a parlor
or study than an official courtroom"). The juvenile judges hoped that this more
relaxed environment would elicit trust and respect from the offender before them.
See id. at 144-45 (describing juvenile judges' attitudes towards courtroom).
43. See id. at 141-45 (describing informal methodology that juvenile court
judges were supposed to embrace when handling juvenile cases); Feld, supra note
25, at 476-78 (identifying howjuveniles began to receive special treatment that was
outside realm of traditional criminal justice).
44. See Feld, supra note 25, at 477 (stating that "an extremely wide frame of
relevance and an absence of controlling rules or norms characterized this type of
decision-making"). See generally David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of
the Juvenile Court, in CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 38, at 13 (discussing history of
juvenile transfer).
45. See Tanenhaus, supra note 44, at 21, 23-25 (noting how judges initially
"passively" transferred juveniles by failing to do anything to keep youth in juvenile
jurisdictional power).
46. See id. at 24 (noting that lack of uniform standards and extreme judicial
discretion created system in which juveniles were treated differently from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction).
2005] NOTE
7
Anders: Bad Children or a Bad System: Problems in Federal Interpretation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
juveniles were subject to the whim of their "friend," the judge, throughout
the waiver process.
4 7
B. Development of the Modern Juvenile Justice System
Although rehabilitating, not punishing, was at the heart of the juve-
nile justice movement, the ideology changed.48 As juvenile proceedings
evolved, the results of these relaxed proceedings more closely resembled
the punitive outcomes of criminal trials. 49 Despite this fact, many believed
that juveniles were not entitled to the constitutional protections of due
process provided to adults facing similar charges because juvenile waiver
proceedings were civil in nature.50 Nonetheless, a series of Supreme
Court cases focusing on juvenile rights, an issue rarely before the Court,
drastically changed the nature of the juvenile justice system. 5 1
47. See CLAPP, supra note 31, at 19 (providing narrative ofjuvenile court activi-
ties). The first juvenile court judge in Chicago, Judge Tuthill, was advised by sev-
eral women from the area's Woman's Club about his young defendants'
backgrounds. See id. (describing courtroom scene in Chicago).
48. See generally CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 38, at 2-33 (examining in-
depth developments of juvenile justice system since its inception).
49. Cf Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (noting need for pro-
cedural safeguard in hearings "of such tremendous consequences"). The Supreme
Court was concerned that during these "civil" proceedings juveniles could face
serious criminal sanctions because of the inadequate framework available under
the parens patriae idea. See id. at 554-55 (noting that juvenile proceedings are
"civil" in nature, but that does not invite "procedural arbitrariness"). In its opin-
ion, the Court expressed concern over the current state of juvenile proceedings
when it noted, "[i]t is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with
respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner." Id. at 554.
50. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children's Rights, in HANDBOOK
OF YOUTH ANDJUSTICE 377-88 (Susan 0. White ed., 2001) (discussing development
of children's rights).
In Kent, the Court addressed the assertion that lower courts based their juve-
nile decisions on the idea that in "civil" waiver proceedings, juveniles could not
claim deprivation of criminal due process rights because they were not being tried
as criminals. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555 (discussing theories relied on by lower courts
in juvenile proceedings tojustify denial of criminal due process protections). The
Supreme Court later clarified that juvenile defendants have certain constitutional
protections, but the Court held that these protections were not as extensive as
those afforded to adult criminal defendants. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30
(1967) (explaining that juveniles are not entitled to all protections afforded in
criminal proceedings).
51. See generally Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (holding that detention
of juveniles is allowed under certain circumstances); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975) (holding that waiver ofjuvenile to criminal court following adjudication in
juvenile court constitutes double jeopardy); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (holding that jury trials are not constitutionally required in juvenile
proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that state must prove
delinquency beyond reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (holding that in
hearings potentially resulting in confinement, juveniles have basic constitutional
rights); Kent, 383 U.S. at 562 (holding that juveniles are entitled to "essentials of
due process" when facing transfer); see also REPORT, supra note 12, at 90-91
(describing series of important Supreme Court cases relating to juveniles).
[Vol. 50: p. 227
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss2/4
20051 NOTE
1. Supreme Court Refinements of the Juvenile Justice System
a. The Birth of Juvenile Due Process: Kent v. United States
In Kent v. United States,52 the United States Supreme Court held, for
the first time, that juveniles were entitled to the "essentials of due pro-
cess." 53 Morris Kent, a sixteen-year-old boy, confessed to breaking and en-
tering, robbery and rape. 54 Kent's mother retained counsel for her son,
who subsequently disclosed the possibility that Kent could be tried as an
adult.55 Kent's attorney filed a motion for a hearing on the waiver ofjuris-
diction. 56 Without ruling on the merits of the motion, the judge deter-
mined a "full investigation" had been completed and waived jurisdiction
over Kent's case. 57 None of the judge's findings or reasons for waiving
jurisdiction was given. 5s After the waiver, Kent was sentenced as an adult
in criminal court to serve five to fifteen years on each count, for a total
prison term of thirty to ninety years.
59
On review, the Supreme Court addressed the notion of parens patriae,
calling into question a juvenile judge's once unlimited power. 60 In its dis-
52. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
53. See id. at 562 (holding that essentials of due process are required when
transferring juveniles to criminal system). These rights include the opportunity to
have a hearing, access to social records, probation reports and a statement assess-
ing the reasons for transfer to the criminal system. See id. at 561-63 (explaining
"essentials of due process"). The Court elaborated, however, that the hearings do
not have to meet all the requirements of a traditional criminal trial or administra-
tive hearing. See id. (acknowledging that juvenile proceedings are distinct from
criminal ones). Therefore, although the Court made a strong statement that the
rights ofjuveniles are indeed protected, it maintained the difference between the
criminal system and juvenile justice system. See id. (noting procedural differ-
ences); see also Feld, supra note 25, at 478-94 (discussing impact of Supreme
Court's decisions).
54. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 543 (describing facts of case).
55. See id. at 544-45 (outlining case chronology).
56. See id. at 545-46 (elaborating on counsel's motions for waiver hearing and
evidentiary admission of information pertaining to Kent's mental health for pur-
poses of transfer).
57. See id. at 546 (noting that ruling made by juvenile court judge was pro-
vided without rationale for decision). When pondering how the juvenile court
judge made his decision and in examining the waiver, the Supreme Court said,
"He made no findings. He did not receive any reason for the waiver. He made no
reference to the motions filed by petitioner's counsel." Id.
58. See id. at 546-47 (postulating that district court judge must have consid-
ered evidence even though record had no information showingjudge had consid-
ered evidence).
59. See id. at 550 (reporting outcome of criminal court trial).
60. See id. at 551-52, 555-56 (criticizing parens patriae). In holding that basic
constitutional protections should be provided to juveniles, the Court stated:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose ofjuvenile
courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to
whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical
purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of
constitutional guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence
that some juvenile courts... lack the personnel, facilities and techniques
9
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cussion, the Court recognized some of the problems inherent in the juve-
nile justice system, including the "considerable latitude" judges have in
determining whether to retain jurisdiction over a juvenile's case. 61 Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Fortas stated that the discretion "does not confer
upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure. '6 2 Criticizing
the parens patriae theory, Justice Fortas wrote that a juvenile could "re-
ceive[ ] the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections ac-
corded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children." 63 Consequently, the Court held that juveniles
facing waiver to the criminal system were entitled to a hearing, access to
social records, probation reports and a statement by the judge stating the
reasons for the waiver.
64
Kent is also significant because the Court delineated various "determi-
native factors" that district court judges are supposed to use in discretion-
ary waiver decisions.65 Initially, the Court's eight factors provided the
perception of uniformity in waiver determinations. 6 6 Ultimately, however,
application of the eight factors confused lower courts and resulted in the
to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae
capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law violation.
Id. at 555-56. Thus, the flexible personalized proceedings that had once been so
important to the Progressive reformers of the juvenile justice movement were
slowly being worn away by the Supreme Court's decisions focusing on more rigid
standards and guidelines. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (expanding
constitutional protections afforded to juveniles); Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56 (same).
For a discussion of the philosophical background Progressive reformers believed
in as well as their ideal juvenile justice system, see supra notes 21-47 and accompa-
nying text.
61. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 553 (explaining that limited discretion exists in juve-
nile justice system).
62. See id. (discussing how judges must stay within constitutional limits when
determining judicial waiver).
63. Id. at 556.
64. See id. at 561-63 (elaborating factors and requirements that district court
judges must evaluate prior to decision to waive juvenile proceeding). The Court
pointedly held that "[m]eaningful review requires that the reviewing court should
review. It should not be remitted to assumptions." Id. at 561.
65. See id. at 566-67 (enumerating eight factors judges are to use in determin-
ing appropriate jurisdiction). The Supreme Court listed eight factors for general
guidance that are loosely mirrored by the current FJDA factors for discretionary
waiver. See id. (suggesting factors for guidance in district court proceedings). The
Court dictated that district courtjudges should consider: (1) the seriousness of the
alleged offense in relation to protecting the community's safety; (2) whether the
nature of the alleged offense was aggressive, violent or premeditated; (3) whether
the alleged offense was against persons or property; (4) the merits of the com-
plaint; (5) the need to try the entire case in one court; (6) maturity of the charged;
(7) record and previous history; and (8) the prospect of rehabilitation. See id. at
566-67 (detailing list of waiver factors district court judges are to use).
66. See Feld, supra note 25, at 491 ("The addition of long lists of supposed
substantive standards, such as that appended by the Supreme Court in Kent, does
not provide objective indicators to guide discretion.").
236
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differential waiver process that exists today.6 7 One commentator has also
argued that Kent's endorsement of judicial waiver marked the erosion of
rehabilitative ideas and began the era of serving youths their 'just
deserts." 68 Moreover, the introduction of procedural safeguards and "de-
terminative factors" in transfer decisions made the juvenile justice system
more akin to its adult criminal counterpart. 69 Thus, the Kent decision cut
away the traditional theoretical underpinning of the juvenile court system
with its criticism of the Progressive movement's notion of parens patriae
and introduction of a more punitive ideology. 70
b. Juvenile Due Process Matures: In re Gault
A further departure from the Progressives' original vision of the juve-
nile justice system came in the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in In re
Gault.71 Fifteen-year-old Gerald Francis Gault was taken into custody after
a neighbor complained that he was making lewd phone calls. 72 Gault's
parents were not given notice of his arrest and at the juvenile delinquency
hearing Gault did not have counsel, nor was he told of his right to have
counsel. 73 The Supreme Court held that certain rights were guaranteed
and that "due process of law requires ... notice which would be deemed
constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding."7
4
In re Gault affirmed that juveniles are afforded certain basic constitu-
tional due process protections in hearings that could result in commit-
ment to an adult institution. 75 These procedural protections include the
right to counsel, sufficient notice, the right to question witnesses and pro-
tection against self-incrimination, even if the proceedings were not "crimi-
nal" in theory. 76 In fact, the added protections that the Supreme Court
defined in In re Gault pushed the ideology behind the juvenile justice sys-
67. See id. at 491-92 (elaborating on perception of uniformity that was cre-
ated through Kent decision); see also Tanenhaus, supra note 44, at 32 (citing Feld's
interpretation of Kent).
68. See Tanenhaus, supra note 44, at 33 (characterizing Kent decision as ideo-
logical shift in juvenile justice).
69. See id. at 32 (noting turn of juvenile focus towards punishment).
70. See id. at 32-33 (noting that Kent marked end of parens patriae era because
of its inclusion of procedural safeguards of due process). The Supreme Court's
decision in Kent to introduce formalities into a system that once prided itself on
flexibility forever altered the development of the juvenile justice system as the line
separating the Progressives' rehabilitative ideal and the criminal world's punish-
ment ideal became increasingly blurred. See id. (examining significance of Kent
decision and briefly discussing shifting philosophy post-Kent).
71. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
72. See id. at 3-4 (stating facts of case).
73. See id. at 33 (examining due process violations in Gault's case).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 3 (explaining that failure to observe fundamental constitutional
protections led to huge problems in juvenile justice system that needed to be
remedied).
76. See id. (detailing protections afforded to juveniles).
2005] NOTE
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tem closer to punishment and farther from the importance of a child's
amenability to rehabilitation.7 7 Blurring the once clear distinction be-
tween juvenile court and criminal court purposes, the Court stated:
There is no material difference in this respect between adult and
juvenile proceedings of the sort here involved .... A proceeding
where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delin-
quent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is compa-
rable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. 78
2. Federal Legislative Advances in Juvenile Justice
Following the states' lead in creating distinct juvenile justice systems,
the federal government passed the FJDA in the late 1930s. 79 The FJDA
establishes when and how juvenile offenders will be treated in the federal
system. 80 The purpose of the FJDA is to transfer youthful offenders to the
criminal justice system when deemed in the best interests of the child and
society, and retain those juveniles capable of rehabilitation in the juvenile
justice system in order to avoid the stigma of being a convicted criminal.8 1
77. See Feld, supra note 25, at 478-79 (noting that introduction of protection
against self-incrimination no longer allowed juvenile proceedings to be classified
as "non-criminal"). Furthermore, later transfer and sentencing decisions moved
away from the Progressive movement's framework and towards the substantive
goals of criminal law. See id. at 483 (discussing changes in juvenile justice system
from its inception). In only one hundred years, the system had dramatically
shifted towards punishment, ironically coming full circle in its understanding of
the development of juvenile offenders by reverting to the same ideas that were
embraced in the early common law practice of treating juveniles similarly to adults.
See id. (noting shift towards punishment); see also FELD, supra note 31, at 290 (point-
ing out that since Gault decision juvenile court has assimilated many qualities of
criminal court).
78. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36. The Gault Court's shifting attitude towards the
seriousness of juvenile justice proceedings through the introduction of new proce-
dural protections signaled an increasing willingness to characterize the proceed-
ings as punitive. See id. at 36-37 (noting that waiver proceedings carry "awesome
prospect of incarceration").
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2004) (noting guidelines for delinquency proceed-
ings in district court and noting guidelines for juvenile waivers).
80. See id. (providing statutory language for juvenile treatment in district
court). Additional legislative reform came with the passage of the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), which requires judicial approval before
transfer, restricts the offenses for which a juvenile can be tried as an adult and
takes away the federal court's unlimited juvenile jurisdictional power. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5601-5668 (2004); see alsoJoseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Re-
thinking Federal Intervention in Juvenile Justice, 51 WASH. U.J. URu. & CONTEMP. L. 331,
338-44 (1997) (noting changes in congressional legislation and subsequent effects
on juvenile justice).
81. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that
FJDA seeks to protect both child's and society's interests). In describing the pur-
pose of the FJDA, the court in In re Sealed Case stated, "[t] he Act is premised on the
notion that it is in the best interest of both the juvenile and society that juveniles
be insulated from the stigma associated with criminal trials, the publicity, the re-
[Vol. 50: p. 227
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The FJDA permits federal jurisdiction only under specifically enumer-
ated circumstances. 82 Resting on a strong presumption against trying
juveniles in the federal system, the FJDA favors state jurisdiction in juve-
nile matters. 83 The FJDA allows only three instances in which the Attor-
ney General may assert jurisdiction over ajuvenile in federal court: (1) the
juvenile state court does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume it; (2)
the state does not have the available programs or services; or (3) the crime
is a drug offense or violent felony.
84
Traditionally, the impact of the FJDA has been limited because of ju-
risdictional deference to state juvenile prosecution.8 5 Nevertheless, be-
cause the federal and state juvenile justice systems have incorporated the
eight subjective "determinative factors" provided in Kent into their juvenile
waiver statutes, both systems face many of the same problems with inter-
pretation.8 6 Furthermore, the problems that federal court judges have
when attempting to properly apply the six waiver factors under the FJDA
reflect the same difficulties faced by state court judges when interpreting
and applying state waiver statutes.8 7 Therefore, while the FJDA does not
tributive atmosphere and threat of criminal incarceration attendant to criminal
proceedings." Id. at 367-68.
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (elaborating on when it is proper to assert federal
jurisdiction over juveniles).
83. See id. (enumerating instances when federal jurisdiction may be proper in
absence of state asserting jurisdiction).
84. See id. (listing three possible areas of federal jurisdiction). The statute
states that federal jurisdiction will not be proper unless:
[A]fter investigation, [the Attorney General] certifies to the appropriate
district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other
appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to as-
sume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of
juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and
services adequate for the needs ofjuveniles, or (3) the offense charged is
a crime of violence that is a felony or an offense described in section 401
of the Controlled Substances Act, or section 1002 (a), 1003, 1005, 1009, or
1010(b) (1), (2), or (3) of the Controlled Substances Import and Export
Act, section 922(x) or section 924(b), (g), or (h) of this title, and that
there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant
the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. See id. (acknowledging deference to state juvenile jurisdiction); see also Ull-
man, supra note 3, at 1349 (noting that states have specialized courts, judges and
rehabilitation facilities because state courts receive majority of juvenile cases).
86. Compare Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966) (listing statu-
tory factor guidelines in federal proceedings), with State v. Hartpence, 42 P.3d
1197, 1200-01 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (listing statutory factors used in Kansas
proceedings).
87. Cf Hartpence, 42 P.3d at 1201-03 (examining Kansas's standard used to
determine whether jurisdictional waiver overjuvenile case is proper). In Harpence,
many of the same issues that regularly arise under the FJDA were addressed, in-
cluding: the balancing of evidence to determine whether transfer is warranted, the
ability of state judges to weigh the evidence as they deem proper and even the
consideration of transfer factors similar to those enumerated by the FJDA. See id.
at 1199-1200 (listing factors used in Kansas transfer decisions).
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currently have a massive impact on juveniles, problems with its interpreta-
tion highlight the same need to reform waiver factors, which exists in both
the state and federal juvenile justice systems.88
In addition, the federal role in juvenile prosecution is likely to in-
crease as more crimes become federalized.8 9 Even though the statute lim-
its federal jurisdiction, youth crime and gang violence are within the
federal statute's jurisdiction.9 0 Currently, Congress has pending legisla-
tion to increase punishments for juvenile offenders in gang-related of-
fenses.9 1 The legislation would increase the investigatory resources
devoted to federal juvenile gang-related crimes and increase the severity of
punishment for the related federal offenses.9 2 This may result in an in-
crease in the number of juvenile cases brought into the federal criminal
justice system. 93 Furthermore, public perceptions of ajuvenile crime epi-
Additionally, one commentator who examined Florida's juvenile laws noted
that as the system currently stands, there is a state problem that mirrors the federal
juvenile justice problem: the juvenile justice system in Florida does not focus on
the treatment and rehabilitation needs of juvenile offenders due to the lack of
concrete criteria to apply. See Cynthia R. Noon, "Waiving" Goodbye toJuvenile Defend-
ants, Getting Smart vs. Getting Tough, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 431, 442 (1994) (explain-
ing application of Florida juvenile law in relation to judicial waiver). Furthermore,
children in both the state and federal system experience the same problem-how
to navigate the ambiguous jurisdictional criteria of the juvenile justice system. Cf
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (listing vague transfer criteria to determine when waiver is appro-
priate in federal jurisdiction) with Hartpence, 42 P.3d at 1200-01 (listing vague
transfer criteria to determine when waiver is appropriate in Kansas state
jurisdiction).
88. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 71 P.3d 919, 927 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (exam-
ining Arizona state juvenile system that juvenile argued was unconstitutional by
allowing judge, not jury, to determine whether to try him as adult).
89. See THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Overview: Over-Criminalization of Social and
Economic Conduct (Nov. 17, 2004), at http://www.overcriminalized.com/index.
html (examining increase in federalization of crimes in America); see also Robert E.
Shepherd, Jr., Trying Juveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM. JusT. 45, 47 (1994) (noting
increased likelihood that juveniles will be prosecuted in federal court under FJDA
either as delinquents or because of waiver); Smith, supra note 3, at 1437 (pointing
out likely increase in federal prosecution ofjuvenile crimes).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (permitting federal prosecution of juvenile drug
crimes and organized violence).
91. See S. 1735, 108th Cong. (2003) (elaborating on purpose of pending legis-
lation to increase focus on juvenile crime leaders). For a discussion of that pend-
ing legislation, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
92. See S. 1735, 108th Cong. (detailing plan to increase federalization ofjuve-
nile crime). The pending legislation's stated purpose is:
To increase and enhance law enforcement resources committed to inves-
tigation and prosecution of violent gangs, to deter and punish violent
gang crime, to protect law-abiding citizens and communities from violent
criminals, to revise and enhance criminal penalties for violent crimes, to
reform and facilitate prosecution ofjuvenile gang members who commit
violent crimes, to expand and improve gang prevention programs, and
for other purposes.
Id.
93. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1437 (noting probable increase of federal pros-
ecution under FJDA).
[Vol. 50: p. 227
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demic continue to fuel both state and federal government efforts to "crack
down" on youth crimes as part of a get-tough-on-crime plan.94 Therefore,
this new legislation coupled with public opinions on juvenile crime may
increase the FJDA's importance in upcoming years. 95
III. THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT AND DISCRETIONARY
JUDICIAL WAIVERS TO CRIMINAL COURT
Transferring juveniles to criminal court is not a new phenomenon.9 6
In fact, the ability to waive juveniles into the criminal justice system has
been available since the 1920s.9 7 Currently, under the FJDA, ajuvenile in
the federal system may be tried either as an adult or as a juvenile.98 Spe-
cifically, the juvenile offender may be adjudicated in the juvenile justice
system, automatically transferred to the criminal justice system, or trans-
ferred to the criminal justice system at the discretion of the district court
judge using judicial waiver.9 9
The primary mechanism used to transfer a juvenile to criminal court
is discretionary judicial waiver. 100 Under judicial waiver, a judge makes
94. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 85 (noting that public perceptions resulted
in new legislation); see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVEN-
TION, The Scope ofJuvenile Violence, available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/reform/
chla.html (discussing trends in juvenile crime and public's reaction to them)
(last visited Nov. 19, 2004).
95. For a further discussion of the increasing importance of the FJDA, see
supra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
96. See Feld, supra note 25, at 478 (noting judicial discretion to waive juveniles
to criminal court has always existed).
97. See MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UP-
DATE ON VIOLENCE 29 (1997) (noting that waiver has been available since inception
ofjuvenile justice system); see also Feld, supra note 25, at 478 (same). Additionally,
Feld asserts that the waiver of serious cases has silenced criticism that courts were
"coddling" criminals. See Feld, supra note 25, at 478 (noting waiver may be reac-
tion to contemporary criticism).
"Transfer" is a general term that refers to three mechanisms: judicial waiver,
statutory exclusion and prosecutorial discretion. See generally HowARD N. SNYDER
ET AL., JUVENILE TRANSFERS TO CRIMINAL COURT IN THE 1990's: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM FOUR STUDIES 1-9 (2000) (studying state juvenile justice transfer proceed-
ings). In the transfer process, three different decision-makers are involved in de-
termining whether an individual case will be waived. See id. at 1, 4-5. The judge
decides during judicial waiver, the legislature determines the statutory exclusion of
a mandatory transfer and the prosecution petitions for prosecutorial discretion to
waive the case to the criminal system. See id. This Note is only concerned with
examining juvenile transfer with respect to discretionary judicial waiver in the fed-
eral system.
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2004) (explaining status factors); see, e.g., United
States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that waiver hearings
result in adjudication of status only).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (explainingjurisdictional possibilities for juvenile de-
linquent under FJDA).
100. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 103 (noting that judicial waiver among state
courts is most common transfer method); see also CENTER FOR THE STUDY AND PRE-
VENTION OF VIOLENCE, Juvenile Waivers in Adult Court, available at http://www.colo
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the decision in the "interest of justice;" this vague term and method of
transfer are the focus of this Note.' 0 ' In passing the FJDA, Congress tried
to give this formless phrase meaning by delineating six factors to guide
judicial waiver decisions. 10 2 The government must present any existing
evidence on each of the six factors, and the district court judge must make
a ruling on the record in relation to each of the factors. 10 3 If the judge
fails to make a finding regarding any statutory factor, the case will be re-
manded for additional findings.
10 4
In addition to considering the six statutorily defined factors,' 0 5 judges
are supposed to take into account the youth's leadership role in the crimi-
nal activity. 10 6 It is important to note, however, that the decision to waive
jurisdiction is solely a status issue and is not indicative of innocence or
rado.edu/cspv/publications/factsheets/cspv/FS-008.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2004) (discussing some effects that waiver may have on juvenile). The website
notes trends in transfer and the physical and mental impact that transfers to the
criminal system may have on juveniles. See id. (noting impact on juveniles, includ-
ing increased delays in adjudication, few treatment options and increased
assaults).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (stating that after waiver hearing judge will deter-
mine whether there is "substantial federal interest" to exert federal jurisdiction).
102. See id. (listing statutory factors to further define what "in the interest of
justice" mandates). For a further discussion of the six statutory factors, see supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 ("Evidence of the following [six statutory factors]
shall be considered, and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the
record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest ofjustice .... "); see
also, e.g., United States v. AnthonyY., 172 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Sec-
tion 5032 mandates that the district court consider and make findings as to each of
the six statutory factors. In addition, the government must present evidence on
each factor.").
104. See, e.g., United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1991)
("The language of section 5032 plainly and expressly requires that the district
court make findings in the record with respect to each of the factors outlined."). In
Romulus, the district court failed to make findings regarding two of the statutory
factors. See id. (noting lack of findings). The Fourth Circuit made no determina-
tion as to whether the case ultimately would be judicially waived, but it determined
that section 5032 clearly requires findings on each statutory factor. See id. at
715-16 (explaining that case may still be waived after findings are made regarding
juvenile's intellectual development and availability of rehabilitation programs).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (listing factors). For a further discussion of the six
factors, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (explaining consideration of leadership role in
crime). The statute states:
In considering the nature of the offense, as required by this paragraph,
the court shall consider the extent to which the juvenile played a leader-
ship role in an organization, or otherwise influenced other persons to
take part in criminal activities, involving the use or distribution of con-
trolled substances or firearms.
Id. This language, coupled with the pending legislation, demonstrates the in-
creased importance the FJDA will have in the near future. For a further discussion
of the importance of the pending legislation, see supra note 87-95 and accompany-
ing text.
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guilt. 10 7 In theory, the waiver hearing is a civil proceeding to determine
proper jurisdiction for the case.108
Although the waiver hearing may be a civil proceeding to determine a
juvenile's jurisdictional status, the hearing has very tangible results in the
criminal justice system.10 9 The decision to waive jurisdiction to criminal
court has a serious impact on the quality of life a juvenile offender may
expect. 1 10 For example, juveniles who are convicted and sentenced in the
criminal system face an increased likelihood of sexual assaults and violent
attacks while in prison. 1 ' They are twice as likely to be beaten by prison
staff and twice as likely to be attacked with a weapon while in prison.1
1 2
Additionally, the rehabilitation programs emphasized at the juvenile level
are often much weaker at the adult level, where the focus is on punish-
ment rather than rehabilitation.'113 Furthermore, juveniles tried and con-
victed as adults often receive harsher sentences than adults in the same
jurisdiction."14 Moreover, some of the most significant statistics suggest
that juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities were quicker to rescind upon
release and also committed more serious crimes than those housed in ju-
107. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that waiver hearings are civil proceedings resulting in adjudication of status
only).
108. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) (noting civil
nature of proceedings); Parker, 956 F.2d at 171 (noting that proceedings for waiver
are in theory civil even though end result may be punishment for juvenile).
109. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Statistics,
available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/offenders/faqs.asp#l (compiling vari-
ous statistics on juvenile offenders) (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
110. See COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, Transfer: Sending Children to Adult
Court, at http://www.juvjustice.org/resources/fs008.html (providing statistics on
juveniles who are transferred or waived) (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); see also Ullman,
supra, note 3, at 1345-51 (noting potential ramification of transferring juvenile to
criminal system). See generally HANS ToCH, LIVING IN PRISON: THE ECOLOGY OF SUR-
vivAL 185-234 (1992) (examining inmate victimization in prison).
111. See COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 110 (noting juveniles
held in adult facilities are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted than those
held injuvenile institutions). Also, the suicide rate ofjuveniles held in adult facili-
ties is eight times higher than those serving in juvenile detention facilities. See id.
(noting suicide rate among juveniles in adult prisons).
112. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Rush to Waive Children to Adult Court, 10
CRaM. JUST. 39, 42 (1995) (noting potential consequences that imprisonment in
adult facility may have on juvenile).
113. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 94-96 (comparing goals of juvenile justice
system with goals of criminal justice system). See generally Donna Bishop & Charles
Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 38, at 227 (ex-
amining consequences of transfer from juvenile to adult status).
114. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 178 (noting phenomenon that transferred
juveniles often received substantially longer sentences than adults age eighteen
and older for same crime). For a murder conviction, transferred juveniles re-
ceived a maximum sentence that was on average two years and five months longer
than the average maximum prison sentences for adults age eighteen or older. See
id. (comparing mean maximum sentence length for convicted transferred
juveniles, adults under age eighteen and adults older than age eighteen).
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venile facilities. 15 Therefore, a presumption in favor of trying a minor as
ajuvenile exists because of the potential ramifications of placing ajuvenile
in the criminal justice system.1 16
Although judges must make a finding on each of the six factors, they
have broad discretion over the weight assigned to each factor. 117 Ajudge
need not weigh each factor equally in the proceedings.' 18 Even if only
one factor points in favor of waiver and all others do not, the judge may
still waive jurisdiction in that case.1 19 Consequently, the discretionary na-
ture of the judicial waiver system has created a system in which juveniles
are not receiving the same, or in some cases even similar, evaluations from
judges. 120
115. See id. at 182 (analyzing results of study ofjuveniles who were transferred
to criminal court and control group who remained in juvenile justice system).
116. See United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting pre-
sumption in favor ofjuvenile adjudication); United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 706
(3d Cir. 1994) (same). Despite the serious consequences of waiver, the evidentiary
burden in waiver hearings is only by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting evidentiary bur-
den in waiver hearings). The Parker court stated:
[Juvenile charged in the case] further argues that the district court erred
in not requiring the government to prove its case for transfer beyond a
reasonable doubt. We disagree. A transfer hearing is not a criminal pro-
ceeding which results in an adjudication of guilt or innocence, but a civil
proceeding which results in an adjudication of status. As such, the gov-
ernment's burden of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence.
Id.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male M.C., 322 F.3d 482, 485-86 (8th
Cir. 2002) (explaining that district court may weigh some factors more heavily
than others); United States v. A.R., 203 F.3d 955, 961 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that
district court has wide discretion when balancing and weighing factors); United
States v. Wellington, 102 F.3d 499, 506 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting freedom of district
court judge to weigh six factors asjudge deems proper).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1989) ("A
court is certainly not required to weigh all statutory factors equally.").
119. See, e.g., United States v. M.L., 811 F. Supp. 491, 494 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
(holding that court may properly find within its discretionary power that nature of
offense outweighed all other statutory factors and warranted waiver).
120. See Ullman, supra note 3, at 1357-58 (explaining that disparity exists in
juvenile justice system so that similarly situated offenders are not receiving similar
treatment); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Challenging Change: Legal Attacks on
Juvenile Transfer Reform, 12 CIUM. JUST. 55, 55-56 (1997) (noting constitutional at-
tacks on state transfer statutes based on alleged violation of equal protection).
This reasoning similarly applies at the federal level because juveniles are being
transferred for different reasons in this context as well. See id. (noting constitu-
tional attacks).
Constitutional attacks against juvenile waiver made on equal protection
grounds, however, have had limited success. See id. (noting that broad discretion is
widely accepted principle in juvenile proceedings). Nevertheless, the Delaware Su-
preme Court struck down the state's juvenile transfer statute on equal protection
grounds. See Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 252 (Del. 1994) (finding equal protec-
tion violation based on removal of statutory provision that allowed judicial investi-
gation into factual basis of charged felony). The Hughes court stated:
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Of the six factors, judges take the greatest liberty interpreting the
meaning of "prior delinquency record."12 ' The confusion and variation
in determining a juvenile's prior record leads to a process in which
juveniles receive disparate treatment because judges have wide discretion
and each exercises that discretion differently. 122 Indeed, balancing the six
factors to determine whether a discretionary waiver is appropriate is an
arduous task. 123
IV. DETERMINING WHAT "PRIOR DELINQUENCY RECORD" INCLUDES AND
How TO USE IT FOR WAIVER PURPOSES
The vagueness and lack of legislative guidance when interpreting the
meaning of "prior delinquency record" under the FJDA has led to a split
among the circuits. 124 Some circuits broadly construe the meaning of
"prior delinquency record" to include any and all contact a juvenile has
had with the police, even if the juvenile was never charged with a crime.' 25
Other circuits evaluate this prong by including only evidence of prior ad-
judicated incidents. 12 6 The circuit split focuses on the types of past con-
Further, under the statute, children unfairly charged with committing a
felony but convicted of a misdemeanor are accorded disparate treatment
from those children charged with a misdemeanor. The former are
treated as criminals on the basis of an unproven accusation while the
latter are treated as delinquents and receive proceedings in their best
interest. Therefore, the distinction is patently arbitrary and bears no ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate government interest.
Id.
121. Compare United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610, 612-14 (7th Cir. 1998)
(interpreting FJDA to allow admission ofjuvenile's charged and uncharged con-
duct based on examination of FJDA meaning), with In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363,
364 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (interpreting FJDA to deny admission ofjuvenile's uncharged
conduct based on examination of FJDA meaning). See generally Smith, supra note 3
(addressing meaning of "prior delinquency record" under FJDA and problems as-
sociated with term).
122. Cf United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1119-20 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The
FJDA directs the court to consider and make findings upon the following factors
when determining the appropriateness of a transfer .... The court, however, is
free to determine how much weight to give each factor.").
123. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir.
1999) ("The decision to transfer is a grave and often difficult one, and does not
lend itself to simple mathematical formulas."); United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp.
1398, 1404 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (" [S] triking the balance between rehabilitation, protec-
tion, and punishment is not easy .... ).
124. For a further discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 125-64 and
accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Wilson, 149 F.3d at 613 (permitting review of arrests that did not
result in adjudications when determining whether to waive juvenile to criminal
justice system).
126. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 893 F.3d at 370 (holding uncharged conduct
may not be considered under "nature of alleged offense" factor). Although this
case dealt specifically with the "nature of the alleged offense" factor, the D.C. Cir-
cuit's reasoning also applies when the court determines what evidence should be
allowed in the "prior delinquency record" factor. See id. at 369 (noting that allega-
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tact with law enforcement that should be encompassed under the prior
record factor for discretionary judicial waiver to criminal court. 127 Cur-
rently, there are different interpretations of "prior delinquency record"
throughout the circuits, demonstrating the lack of uniformity in federal
judicial waiver decisions. 128
A. Broadly Construing the Meaning of "Prior Delinquency Record" to
Encompass All Prior Police Contacts
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed an earlier judgment, United States v. Doe,' 29 allowing courts to
consider incidents not leading to adjudications as part of a juvenile's
"prior delinquency record" when determining whether to waive jurisdic-
tion.1 30 Advocates of this view believe that admitting all of a juvenile's
prior contacts with police will give courts a more accurate foundation on
which to base their ultimate decisions.13 1 At the same time, however, cir-
tions of uncharged conduct will not be corrected at trial despite fact that they may
ultimately convince judges to transfer).
127. See Camitsch v. Risley, 705 F.2d 351, 353 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting great
variations as to what constitutes one's "record"). The court in Camitsch discussed
that "record" has several meanings. See id. ("[W]hen we speak of a witness's or
defendant's 'record,' we refer to a set of facts about that person, consisting of each
previous arrest, whether the arrest led to conviction, and if so, the sentence im-
posed and served."). The court points out that this idea of a "record" is different
from a case file used in prison, on probation or while on trial. See id. (noting
difference in meaning of "record"). Nevertheless, "on occasion all three of these
cases files may be referred to generally as 'records,' creating confusion." Id. The
confusion over what constitutes a record in criminal proceedings can similarly re-
sult in confusion over a "record" in juvenile proceedings under the FJDA. See 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (2004) (delineating six broad waiver factors with one based on prior
"record").
128. For a further discussion of the lack of uniformity in the federal system,
see supra notes 124-26 and infra notes 129-64.
129. 74 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
130. See United States v. Remirez, 297 F.3d 185, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2002) (up-
holding discretionary judicial waiver).
131. See Ullman, supra note 3, at 1358-64 (advocating use of all prior police
contacts in judicial discretionary waiver determinations). In urging courts to
adopt this uniform method, Ullman argues that a contextual analysis of the back-
ground of each juvenile should be performed. See id. at 1359 (recommending that
courts adopt broad definition of "prior delinquency record"). This idea, though
notable and full of merit, is an unrealistic solution for reforming the system be-
cause the federal system would be unable to provide the massive quantities of re-
sources this solution would require. See generally Bishop & Frazier, supra note 113,
at 240 (discussing caseload issues in criminal courts and impact increased discre-
tionary waivers will have). Additionally, by not further refining the factors and
simply allowing the district court to consider all contacts, the extremely discretion-
ary nature of the system is not solved, but only renamed. For a further discussion
of policy suggestions in reforming the system, see infra notes 204-14 and accompa-
nying text.
Furthermore, as in Doe, the government made a similar argument for full dis-
closure of prior contacts in United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (C.D. Ill.
1996) (discussing court's consideration ofjuvenile's record). In its brief, the gov-
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cuits that allow evidence of prior police contacts in the waiver hearing
generally believe that attorneys should not be able to relitigate the merits
of a previous arrest that did not result in adjudication.1 3 2
In Doe, a juvenile faced charges stemming from his alleged involve-
ment in a gang that engaged in repeated acts of violence and narcotics
trafficking. 133 With charges ranging from possession with intent to dis-
tribute crack cocaine to the most serious charge of murder, John Doe was
hardly a naive youth.134 Nevertheless, the court held that mandatory stat-
utory transfer was not warranted in this case.'3 5 Ultimately, the court
faced the issue of whether to waive the case to criminal court in the "inter-
est ofjustice."' 3 6 Acknowledging that the Second Circuit had yet to define
the proper scope of "prior delinquency record," the court relied primarily
on the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Wilson 137 to conclude
ernment addressed several concerns of the court, including the scope of prior re-
cord. See Appellee's Brief at *5-6, United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398 (C.D.
Ill. 1996) (No. 97-1190), available at 1997 WL 33623543 (summarizing reasons to
allow prior contacts). The government stated its case:
The court expressed some uncertainty, for example, as to whether its
consideration of the defendant's "prior delinquency record" was limited
solely to formal adjudications of delinquency, or whether the other infor-
mation available about delinquent behavior described in the juvenile pro-
bation office records and related police reports could be considered as
well.
On that latter point, the government argued that, if the court limited
its inquiry to only actual adjudications in determining the defendant's
record of delinquency, and ignored the facts in cases treated with more
leniency, it would unnecessarily disregard a great deal of highly relevant
information regarding the ultimate issues the court needed to decide. As
the government put it, to "ignore the obvious . . .doesn't seem to be
either sensible or required under the juvenile statutes."
Id. (citations omitted).
132. See TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1404 ("In other words, the Court should and
must consider the entire record, including reasons for dismissal, but it is not ap-
propriate to litigate the merits of a previous arrest at the transfer hearing.").
133. See Doe, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (providing background of charges).
134. See id. (listing charged offenses).
135. See id. at 312-15 (discussing whether mandatory transfer was appropriate
in case and ultimately deciding it was not because charged offense occurred subse-
quent to allegation presently before court).
136. See id. at 321 (holding that mandatory transfer was not warranted, but
discretionary waiver was appropriate). The court also discussed its dismay at the
government's filing of an untimely mandatory transfer motion based on the argu-
ment thatJohn Doe had been "previously found guilty." See id. at 312 (reprimand-
ing government for taking months to file motion). Concluding that "previously
found guilty" related to adjudications, which occurred before the conduct for
which the juvenile was presently before the court, the court noted that there was
"no guidance from Congress as to the meaning of the term 'previous.'" See id. at
313-14 (defining phrase "previously found guilty").
137. 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998). Terry Wilson was a sixteen-year-old
charged with distributing drugs. See id. at 611 (elaborating on facts of case). The
court held that it was proper to weigh Wilson's entire record in determining the
seriousness of his prior record and that the court was not confined to considering
only prior convictions. See id. at 613 (stating holding of case). As a result, jurisdic-
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that evidence that did not result in adjudication could properly be consid-
ered as part of a juvenile's record. 138 Without elaborating on why it
reached this result, the court further expanded the scope of the waiver
factors to allow district courts to consider evidence of uncharged conduct
when analyzing the other discretionary factors. 13 9
The Doe decision negates the purpose of having separate discretionary
factors to guide waiver decisions by enabling judges simply to find some
other method to admit evidence. 140 Other circuits, following the reason-
ing of Doe and Wilson, also have allowed judges to consider unadjudicated
conduct under either the "prior delinquency record" or another factor. 14 '
These results may be consistent with the initial Progressive ideology of a
flexible and individualized juvenile justice system, but they also create
problems. 142 Broad, sweeping judicial discretion creates a system in which
an individual judge may evaluate past conduct with little guidance. 143 For
example, if a juvenile's past crimes had been strictly property related or
involved minor behavioral problems, one judge could give these prior of-
fenses relatively little weight, but another could use these past minor inci-
dents as the sole rationale for waiver, claiming escalating delinquency
problems.' 44 This outcome is permitted because a court need not give
each factor the same weight and may make any finding on the record to
justify its rationale in waiving jurisdiction. 14 5 The disparate treatment
worsens when coupled with the textual interpretational problem sur-
tion over Wilson's case was waived to criminal court where he stood trial as an
adult. See id. at 614 (concluding that because district courts have great discretion
in weighing factors for jurisdictional waiver, lower court was correct in transferring
Wilson's case).
138. See Doe, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 315 n.5 (holding that, based on implicit sup-
port from prior holdings, previous arrests may be considered part of juvenile's
prior delinquency record).
139. See id. (agreeing with other circuits that evidence of behavioral incidents
may be admitted under other discretionary factors for waiver).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir.
1999) (allowing unadjudicated conduct to be admitted under any factor); United
States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 1998) (excluding
unadjudicated conduct under "prior delinquency record," but permitting under
other statutory factors). Even though the court admitted uncharged conduct
under the other factors, the court inJuvenile LWO acknowledged the "highly preju-
dicial" danger of considering evidence of those alleged assaults for discretionary
waiver purposes. See id. at 1184 (noting prejudicial danger).
141. See, e.g., Anthony Y, 172 F.3d at 1253 (allowing unadjudicated conduct to
be admitted under any factor).
142. See Ullman, supra note 3, at 1358 (discussing problems resulting from
lack of uniformity).
143. For a further discussion of the broad freedom of judicial interpretation
that the FJDA currently permits, see supra notes 124-42 and infra notes 144-47
and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., United States v. A.R., 203 F.3d 955, 961-62 (6th Cir. 2000) (not-
ing statutory ambiguities).
145. See id. at 961 (noting broad discretion in applying weight of factors for
waiver).
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rounding the vague term "prior delinquency record."146 A system that
allows differential treatment of juveniles with the same "prior record" or
with similar background information can hardly result in fair and just
adjudications. 14 7
B. Narrowly Construing the Meaning of "Prior Delinquency Record" to
Encompass Only Prior Adjudicated Incidents
Advocates of a narrow reading of "prior delinquency record" argue
that if unadjudicated conduct is admissible, a juvenile could be unduly
prejudiced in a waiver hearing because a judge may assume waiver is
proper based on conduct never before heard or proved in any court.
1 48
Additionally, these advocates claim that a broad reading of the statute,
which allows for the admission of uncharged conduct, violates the funda-
mentals of due process because of thejuvenile's inability to correct inaccu-
racies possibly contained in the record. 149 Without a finding on the
merits of a particular incident before a court of law, the court cannot de-
termine the accuracy of unadjudicated and uncharged incidents.' 5 0
Therefore, a court could not reasonably rely on these events to accurately
determine whether waiver to criminal court is truly in the "interest of
justice."1 51
In In re Sealed Case,152 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit became the first court to hold that narrowly con-
struing a juvenile's prior delinquency record to limit the admissibility of
certain evidence was both in the interest ofjustice and within the meaning
of the FJDA. 15 3 The seventeen-year-old juvenile in that case was arrested
and charged with three counts of cocaine distribution.1 54 Seeking trans-
146. Compare Anthony Y., 172 F.3d at 1253 (taking broad reading of "prior
delinquency record"), with In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(taking narrow reading of "prior delinquency record").
147. See generally Shepherd, supra note 120 (explaining various legal attacks
on juvenile waivers).
148. See United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998)
(noting that "allowing a districtjudge to consider evidence of uncharged crime...
would violate the juvenile's due process rights").
149. See id. (explaining violation of due process argument); see also In re Sealed
Case, 893 F.2d at 369 (same).
150. See In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369 (recognizing that juveniles are not
able to contest and potentially correct uncharged conduct at trial). The un-
charged criminal acts, however, may ultimately affect a judge's decision to waive
jurisdiction and may cause a due process violation. See id. (holding that evidence
of other crimes may not be considered under "nature of the alleged offense" with-
out violating due process).
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2004) ("Criminal prosecution on the basis of the
alleged act may be begun by motion to transfer... in the appropriate district court
• * , if such court finds, after hearing, such transfer would be in the interest of
justice.").
152. 893 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
153. See id. at 364 (stating holding of case).
154. See id. at 364-65 (discussing facts and procedural history).
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fer, the government used the "nature of the alleged offense" factor to in-
troduce evidence of uncharged conduct contained in a police officer's
affidavit.1 55 Relying heavily on this evidence in his decision, the district
courtjudge waived jurisdiction over the juvenile.15 6 On appeal, however,
the D.C. Circuit held that the FJDA's plain language and the fundamental
principles of due process prohibited the consideration of uncharged con-
duct in the waiver hearing. 157 The court reasoned that allowing in "all
kinds of extrinsic evidence" relating to current and past events would con-
travene the purpose of the FJDA. 1 58 Furthermore, the court stated that,
"Congress was concerned with limiting the kind of information that comes
before a judge at a transfer hearing" and therefore, it was proper to ex-
clude certain types of evidence.'
59
Although the D.C. Circuit never expressly stated that the scope of
"prior delinquency record" was limited to adjudicated conduct, its holding
in In re Sealed Case implicitly stands for that proposition. 1 60 Discussing the
six waiver factors, the court found that only two factors-the nature of the
offense and the prior record-relate to actual violations of the law,
thereby limiting the types of admissible unadjudicated conduct. 16 1 Other
courts have also held that the "plain language of the term 'the juvenile's
prior delinquency record' cannot plausibly be interpreted to encompass evi-
dence of unrecorded acts, nor . . . conduct which has not been
adjudicated."1 62
155. See id. at 365 (describing transfer hearing).
156. See id. (noting district court's misplaced reliance on uncharged conduct
when determining whether discretionary judicial waiver was appropriate).
157. See id. at 368 ("The plain language of the phrase, the text surrounding it
and principles of due process make clear that Congress did not intend § 5032's
'the nature of the alleged offense' category to encompass evidence of other un-
charged crimes.").
158. See id. at 368-69 (exploring FJDA's meaning based on plain language of
statute and postulating congressional concerns as to limiting types of evidence per-
mitted in hearings).
159. See id. (limiting admissible evidence in hearing based on congressional
intent and plain language of statute).
160. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1446 (agreeing that court's holding stands for
proposition of limiting scope of "prior record"); cf. In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369
(discussing admissibility of uncharged conduct).
161. See In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369 n.12 (discussing scope of factors for
waiver purpose). In examining the FJDA's six factors, the court stated:
Of course if a juvenile were entitled to rebut the uncharged offenses at
the transfer hearing, due process would not be in issue. But since, as
shown above, the purpose of the Act is rehabilitation and not punish-
ment, Congress could not have contemplated the hearing to focus on a
plethora of uncharged and unproven offenses. Indeed, four of the six
categories on which Congress directed a transfer judge to make findings
are entirely unrelated to the juvenile's alleged violations of law.
Id.
162. United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Nevertheless, some courts taking this position have permitted the ad-
mission of unadjudicated incidents under the other statutory factors.1 63
By stating a narrow holding and restricting the admission of certain evi-
dence under one factor, but allowing in the very same evidence under the
rest of the waiver factors begs the question: Do individual factors even
matter in a FJDA waiver hearing?
1 64
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR USING A NARRow INTERPRETATION OF "PRIOR
DELINQUENCY RECORD" IN DISCRETIONARY
JUDICIAL WAIVER HEARINGS
Inconsistencies in federal judicial interpretations of "prior delin-
quency record" keep mounting as different courts attempt to determine
what evidence should be admissible in waiver hearings. 165 Nonetheless, a
narrow construction of "prior delinquency record" is the most practical
and judicious interpretation for a number of reasons. 1 66 First, the shift in
the primary purpose of the juvenile justice system from rehabilitation to
punishment, coupled with the FJDA's plain language supports a narrow
reading of prior record. 167 Furthermore, fundamental legal principles
163. See id. at 1183-84 (permitting admission of evidence excluded under
prior record under other five factors). In discussing the admissibility of evidence
of uncharged behavioral problems, the court examined the plain language of each
term. See id. (discussing FJDA's factors for discretionary judicial waiver). The
court stated that:
With the lack of persuasive legislative history and the elimination of the
due process concern, we cannot interpret the language as restrictively as
LWO urges. Instead, we hold that section 5032 leaves to the sound discre-
tion of the district court the decision to admit evidence of other incidents
and behavior, that may be alleged to be criminal or delinquent, as rele-
vant to "thejuvenile's present intellectual development and psychological
maturity," "the age and social background of the juvenile," and "the na-
ture of past treatment efforts and thejuvenile's response to such efforts."
The district court must make a determination that such incidents and
behavior are in fact relevant to the statutory factors in the particular case.
Id. at 1183.
164. See generally Ullman, supra note 3 (advocating contextual approach to dis-
cretionary judicial waivers, which would allow excessive amounts of background
information into hearings).
165. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 336 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting interpretation of meaning of "prior delinquency record" is issue of first
impression in circuit). The Ninth Circuit recently noted the current split over the
meaning of prior record, but failed to weigh in on the issue because neither the
appellate nor district court had a complete juvenile record during the transfer
hearing. See id. at 1112 (leaving open meaning of prior record until district court
first evaluated complete record of juvenile).
166. For a further discussion on the merits of using a narrow statutory inter-
pretation of "prior delinquency record," see infra notes 169-203 and accompany-
ing text.
167. For a further discussion of the justification in using a narrow interpreta-
tion based on plain language, see infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
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mandate a narrow interpretation as a way to prevent violations of a juve-
nile's constitutional rights.
168
A. Recent Changes in Juvenile Justice Coupled with the Plain Language
Suggest a Narrow Interpretation
During the past decade, the theory behind juvenile justice has moved
away from rehabilitation and toward punishment. 169 As punishment be-
comes the central focus of the juvenile justice system, the notion of uni-
formity in judicial waiver proceedings becomes increasingly important. 170
Due to the seriousness of punishments and related consequences of facing
charges in criminal courts, juveniles moving through the system should be
evaluated according to the same factors. 17 1 Thus, the recent changes in
the system coupled with the FJDA's plain language support a narrow inter-
pretation of discretionary waiver factors. 172
Through the FJDA, Congress sets out specific factors for the district
courts to consider when assessing a discretionary waiver.173 Each of these
168. For a further discussion of fundamental legal principles that support a
narrow interpretation, see infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
169. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 89 (noting that 1990s saw unprecedented
change in state legislation to get tough on juvenile crime). The report discloses
that transfer provisions in forty-five states have been remodeled to make the trans-
fer of a juvenile offender to the criminal justice system easier. See id. (providing
statistical evidence about transfer in states). Additionally, sentencing authority has
expanded and confidentiality in the proceedings has contracted. See id. (noting
modem trends in juvenile justice). The new sentencing trends reflect the idea of
imposing a punishment consistent with the seriousness of the crime, which implic-
itly moves away from the fundamental notion of creating a system that focuses on
the rehabilitation of a juvenile offender. See id. at 101-08 (examining changes in
juvenile justice system).
170. See SNYDER ET AL., supra note 97, at 6 (addressing assumption that juris-
dictional transfer is reserved for most serious juvenile cases is false because ratio-
nale that triggers transfer is largely unknown).
171. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1460 (concluding that resolution of disagree-
ment is increasingly important in federal courts); Ullman, supra note 3, at 1340-42
(discussing abolition of separate juvenile justice system). See generally Jeffrey A.
Butts, Can WeDo Without Juvenile Justice?, 15 CIM.JusT. 50 (2000) (evaluating possi-
bility of abolishing juvenile justice system). For a further discussion of the impact
that may result from being tried and convicted in the criminal system as opposed
to the juvenile justice system, see supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2004) (delineating six specific factors district court
must consider when determiningjuvenile's status); see also United States v.Juvenile
LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding narrow interpretation of
"prior delinquency record" proper based on statute's plain language); United
States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting specificity of FJDA's
waiver factors). Furthermore, in Jarrett, the court narrowly interpreted what com-
prised a juvenile's record by holding that the government needs only to present
prior adjudicated conduct to provide the full record demanded by the FJDA. See
id. at 537-38 ("We are careful to note . . . that a proffer of records could satisfy
§ 5032's standard of completeness, yet nevertheless omit data that would have sig-
nificantly impacted the district court's transfer determination.").
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (listing factors); see alsoJarrett, 133 F.3d at 539 (not-
ing specific language of FJDA relating to factors for waiver).
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factors allows federal judges to consider certain evidence in waiver hear-
ings.1 74 Congress drafted the FJDA, however, to exclude some types of
conduct from the waiver determination-specifically, unadjudicated inci-
dents.1 75 Congress's decision to enumerate six specific factors, and
thereby preclude a judicial waiver solely in the "interest of justice," also
supports a narrow construction of "prior delinquency record." 1 76 One
court observing congressional concerns as to the types of evidence admit-
ted in discretionary waiver hearings noted, "[t]hat is why it [Congress]
went into such detail laying down 'specific criteria by which the court shall
assess prospects for rehabilitation.
' 177
Traditional definitions of a criminal law record also support a narrow
interpretation of a juvenile's "prior delinquency record.' 78 These tradi-
tional definitions refer to "criminal records" as prior convictions.
179
Therefore, one commentator argues that if "delinquency records" are
analogized to "criminal records," only adjudications-which are similar to
convictions-would be properly considered in a judge's discretionary
decision. 18
0
Lastly, if Congress intended for federal judges to have total discretion
in the hearings, they could have simply drafted the statute to say "in the
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (listing six factors on which judges must make
findings).
175. SeeJuvenile LWO, 160 F.3d at 1183 (concluding that Congress would have
specified if courts were supposed to consider all prior police contacts through spe-
cific statutory language); In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(noting congressional concern with evidence admissible before judge). In Juvenile
LWO, the court examined the statute's plain language and noted that, "we believe
that plain language of the term 'the juvenile's prior delinquency record'cannot plau-
sibly be interpreted to encompass evidence of unrecorded acts." Juvenile LWO, 160
F.3d at 1183.
176. SeeJarrett, 133 F.3d at 539 (noting that Congress specifically drafted stat-
ute "to assign different responsibilities to different actors in the transfer process").
Moreover, Congress elaborated on these factors "in the interest ofjustice" to com-
pel judges to make findings with specific methods. See id. (explaining that FJDA
provides instructions from Congress to judges).
177. In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 368-69 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1011, § 201
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5320).
178. See Ullman, supra note 3, at 1355 (commenting that based on common
law definitions it could be correct to consider only adjudications when determin-
ing what comprises record).
179. See, e.g., Camitsch v. Risley, 705 F.2d 351, 353-54 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting
different meanings of "record"); see also Ullman, supra note 3, at 1355 (discussing
meaning of "criminal records").
180. See Ullman, supra note 3, at 1355 (noting general meaning of "criminal
record" includes prior convictions). Therefore, because the plain language of the
term "prior delinquency record" is unambiguous, turning to the well-established
criminal law definitions would provide guidance for the juvenile courts facing this
interpretational problem. See Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d at 1183 ("Because we con-
clude the plain language of the term 'the extent and nature of thejuvenile's delin-
quency record' is unambiguous, we do not inquire further about Congress' intent
in using the term.").
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interest ofjustice" without elaborating further.181 Congress, however, did
not leave the FJDA's waiver factors at the "interest of justice."' 8 2 There-
fore, in order to stay within the proscribed congressional limitations,
judges should consider only prior adjudications, and not all prior police
contacts, under "prior delinquency record" when evaluating the appropri-
ateness of a discretionary judicial waiver. 1 83
B. Fundamental Principles of the Justice System Mandate a Narrow Reading of
"Prior Delinquency Record"
Narrowly construing the meaning of FJDA's "prior delinquency re-
cord" factor to include only prior adjudications would produce the most
uniform, efficient and constitutionally sound method for determining dis-
cretionary waivers. 1 8 4 Evaluating only those incidents in which ajuvenile
has been adjudicated a delinquent still allows judges to exercise discretion
while balancing the six factors, but also provides a sensible limit to that
discretion.' 8 5 In addition, the type of evidence admitted is limited, creat-
ing a more streamlined and uniform evaluation process for judges making
discretionary waiver decisions.1 8 6 Moreover, courts interpreting the scope
of "prior delinquency record" have discussed possible due process viola-
tions with the admission of evidence of uncharged conduct. 18 7 If courts
181. See Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d at 1183 (noting definitional limits of "prior
delinquency record" based on statute's language); Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 539 (noting
importance of specifically delineating six factors for waiver); In re Sealed Case, 893
F.2d at 368-69 (holding that Congress did not intend FJDA to include uncharged
crimes based on way statute was drafted). The In re Sealed Case court determined
that a narrow interpretation excluding uncharged conduct was proper based on
the plain language and principles of due process. See In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at
368 (examining merits on both sides of interpretation argument).
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2004) (enumerating six statutory factors that are to
be considered overall "in the interest of justice").
183. For a further discussion of the definition of a criminal "record," see supra
notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
184. Cf In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970) (explaining fundamental
principles of American legal system); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967) (describing
constitutional due process requirements for juveniles); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966) (detailing conditions of valid waiver to adult status);
Bishop & Frazier, supra note 113, at 240 (discussing caseload issues in criminal
courts and impact increased discretionary waivers will have). The influx of juve-
nile cases creates the practical problem of accommodating more individuals and
providing more resources in the already overburdened criminal system. See id.
(questioning ability of criminal court to handle juvenile cases).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 845-46 (6th Cir.
1994) (citing United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1984)) (holding
that FJDA does not instruct court to weigh one factor more than another because
court has discretion to balance factors).
186. See, e.g., Juan Alberto Arteaga, Note, Juvenile (In)Justice: Congressional At-
tempts to Abrogate the Procedural Rights of Juvenile Defendants, 102 COLUM. L. Rv.
1051, 1082-87 (2002) (discussing protecting procedural rights of juveniles by
clearly defining uniform guideline to create better system).
187. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting due
process arguments under FJDA). Furthermore, at least one commentator has ar-
[Vol. 50: p. 227
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narrowly interpret the scope of prior record, however, juveniles will be
treated in a more uniform manner and the due process violation argu-
ments that are currently circulating may be dispelled. 188
Furthermore, a narrow interpretation limits admissible evidence in a
discretionary waiver hearing to evidence proved only by a higher eviden-
tiary standard.' 89 Although the juvenile waiver hearings are civil proceed-
ings, a jurisdictional waiver to criminal court may ultimately result in
greater punishment and longer confinement if the individual is found
guilty of the charged conduct.190 Because these hearings can potentially
lead to more serious punishment in the criminal system than in the juve-
nile justice system if the juvenile is convicted of the charges after the
waiver, only evidence proved by a higher evidentiary burden, such as the
clear and convincing standard, should be admissible. 19 1 The resulting
gued that the wide discretion in the application of judicial standards in juvenile
proceedings has led to "justice by geography." See Richard E. Redding, Using Juve-
nile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancement Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is it
Sound Policy?, 10 VA.J. Soc. POL'v & L. 231, 243-44 (2002) (discussing implications
of broad judicial discretion in juvenile courts).
188. See generally Smith, supra note 3 (criticizing FJDA for lack of uniformity
and advocating need for more uniformity); Ullman, supra note 3 (same).
189. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-64 (describing evidentiary standard
required in criminal matters). Because the juvenile court determined these past
adjudicated incidents, certain burdens of proof had to have been met before the
child was "adjudicated a delinquent." See id. at 365-68 (explaining that, in juvenile
criminal proceedings, adjudication of delinquency must be proved beyond reason-
able doubt). Therefore, those incidents are properly proved and would not be
unfairly prejudicial in the waiver hearing. Cf id. at 363 (explaining burdens of
proof for findings of guilt). The same cannot be said of unadjudicated incidents
because those incidents have not been proved to show guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and therefore may violate due process safeguards. Cf id. at 366-67 (ad-
dressing reasons for mandating that juvenile adjudications must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt).
We made clear in that decision [In re Gault] that civil labels and good
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards in juvenile courts, for "[a] proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the
loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution."
Id. (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36).
Although they may have a probative value in the waiver process, courts cannot
ensure the accuracy of the record if these events are admitted. But cf. United
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149-50 (1997) (allowing evidence of acquitted con-
duct proved by preponderance of the evidence into adult criminal sentencing
hearings).
190. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (noting that juvenile
proceedings are "'civil' in nature and not criminal").
191. Cf In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (relaying seriousness of juvenile proceed-
ings through potential loss of liberty and drawing parallel to adult criminal pro-
ceedings). For a further discussion on the impact that waiver may have on the life
of a juvenile, see supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
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framework would be consistent with the parallel constitutional protection
afforded to adults facing a similar deprivation of liberty.
19 2
Moreover, in the United States, criminal defendants are presumed
innocent until proven guilty.1 9 3 Past arrests do not automatically equate
to a past violation of the law unless proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
19 4
Despite that fact, waiver hearings currently do not uphold those two fun-
damental concepts.19 5 Although juveniles are not afforded full constitu-
tional protections, they are guaranteed the essentials.19 6 The essentials
include requiring the prosecution to prove charges beyond a reasonable
doubt.19 7 If unadjudicated conduct is admitted and used to make waiver
determinations, the juvenile is, in essence, being found "guilty" of un-
proven conduct without the protections of due process.198 When courts
allow evidence of unproven conduct in waiver hearings, courts may de-
prive juveniles of the basic protections that the Constitution affords crimi-
nal defendants. 199
192. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-64 (explaining burdens of proof in
criminal proceedings and fundamental role of reasonable doubt standard in
American criminal justice). But see Watts, 519 U.S. at 151-52 (allowing considera-
tion of underlying conduct for which defendant has been acquitted in adult crimi-
nal sentencing hearing).
Watts deals with the sentencing of adult offenders who have been properly
convicted in criminal proceedings, which is distinguishable from the civil discre-
tionary judicial waiver proceedings at issue in this Note. See id. at 155-56 (discuss-
ing what acquittal means for criminal charges). The discretionary judicial waiver
process is a civil proceeding and juveniles are not facing sentencing at this point in
the adjudication process, but rather, are only having the proper status of their case
determined. See United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (ex-
plaining that juvenile waiver proceedings are civil proceedings to determine status
of individual as either adult or juvenile).
193. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (noting "bedrock" principle of presump-
tion of innocence).
194. See id. at 363-64 (stating that presumption of innocence is important in
keeping faith in criminal system by creating confidence that innocent men are not
condemned).
195. See generally Shepherd, supra note 120 (examining different legal attacks,
including due process argument, made against juvenile justice system).
196. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20 (noting that due process is "primary and
indispensable foundation of individual freedom"); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 562 (1966) (citing Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959))
(holding that hearing must "measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment").
197. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-64 (discussing fundamental beliefs of
American criminal justice system and reasons for their existence).
198. See Redding, supra note 187, at 240-46 (asserting that juvenile adjudica-
tions are often less reliable than criminal convictions due to lack of full due pro-
cess in those proceedings).
199. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361 (holding that proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required for all elements of charge). "A person accused of a crime ...
would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of funda-
mental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the
strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case." Id. at 363 (quoting
In re Winship, 247 N.E. 253, 259 (N.Y. 1970) (Fuld, C.J., dissenting)). Moreover,
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Courts that construe "prior delinquency record" to include past ar-
rests and other unadjudicated conduct are disregarding the presumption
of innocence that is fundamental in America.20 0 If a judge is allowed to
consider past incidents that never resulted in adjudications, a juvenile's
rights are violated because that child never had the ability to defend
against the charges.20 1 Even if, as some circuits hold, the waiver proceed-
ings provide an opportunity to correct errors, the damage is done because
the stigma of the past conduct may remain in the judge's mind, tainting
the ultimate determination of whether to waive jurisdiction.20 2 Therefore,
Congress must change the current federal system to provide consistency
and to make the juvenile justice system focus not only on the individual
needs of the child, but also on upholding the Constitution.20 3
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFoRM
TO THE FJDA
Judges disagree on what evidence is admissible in a waiver hearing.
2 0 4
Scholars debating the issue are unsure of the definition of "prior delin-
quency record."20 5 Regardless of whether they argue for a broad or nar-
row definition, these scholars agree that the FJDA's language is vague and
one scholar has argued that delinquency adjudications are already less reliable
than criminal convictions because broad judicial discretion leads to disparate treat-
ment. See Redding, supra note 187, at 240-51 (elaborating on why juvenile adjudi-
cations are not always accurate). Therefore, if the process used to decide whether
ajuvenile committed a charge in the first place is less reliable than that used in the
criminal system, it seems even less fair to allow unproven prior conduct into civil
juvenile waiver hearings in which the protections afforded are even less. Cf id. at
243 (noting that juvenile courts have less rigorous evidentiary and procedural
standards).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir.
1998) (concluding that "it is erroneous for a district court to consider evidence of
incidents or behavior for which there has been no charge or a charge but no
conviction").
201. See, e.g., In reSealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining
uncharged conduct will not be challenged at trial, but court will examine conduct
for waiver purposes).
202. See id. (stating that uncharged conduct "may be what ultimately con-
vinces the judge to transfer the juvenile"). If, however, the information about un-
proven prior conduct is admitted under another factor, the same problem of
tainting the judge's waiver determination will remain. For a further discussion of
the problems associated with allowing unproven prior conduct into the waiver
hearing in any capacity, see supra notes 165-201 and accompanying text.
203. For a further discussion of the basic grants of constitutional protection
based on the Kent and Gault decisions, see supra notes 52-78 and accompanying
text.
204. Compare United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.
1999) (permitting consideration of unadjudicated conduct in waiver hearing), with
In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 370 (prohibiting admission of uncharged conduct in
discretionary waiver hearing).
205. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1444 (commenting on conflicts about defini-
tion of "priorjuvenile delinquency record"); Ullman, supra note 3, at 1329 (same).
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in need of further detailed legislative guidance to make the application of
discretionary waiver factors more effective. 20 6 As one commentator has
noted, "[i]f the selection processes within juvenile court for waiver are not
both fair and coherently explained, it is the whole of the juvenile court's
jurisprudence that is called into question." 20 7
Under the current system, some courts have adopted a broad con-
struction of "prior delinquency record," but others have adopted a narrow
construction.208 These varying constructions have led to differential treat-
ment amongjuveniles facing waiver. 20 9 A move towards uniformity in the
interpretation of the FJDA would reduce the differential treatment faced
by juveniles in the federal system. 210 Clearly delineated and defined fed-
eral guidelines would allow courts to make a waiver decision in the "inter-
est of justice" by enhancing the court's ability to accurately assess a
juvenile's likelihood of rehabilitation. 2 11 Reformation of the six current
waiver factors would also decrease the likelihood of a due process violation
in juvenile court because all juveniles entering the federal system would be
treated uniformly.21 2 The most realistic and practical method to ensure
the necessary uniformity in the judicial waiver process is to allow only prior
206. See Arteaga, supra note 186, at 1082-85 (calling for further legislative
guidance in juvenile transfer proceedings to clarify statutory factors); Smith, supra
note 3, at 1451-60 (urging reformation of current juvenile waiver proceedings to
increase effectiveness); Ullman, supra note 3, at 1363 (concluding that Congress
should reformulate FJDA to include uniform definition that includes all prior po-
lice contacts); see also Jennifer A. Chin, Note, Baby-Face Killers: A Cry for Uniform
Treatment for Youths Who Murder, From Trial to Sentencing, 8 J.L. & POL'v 287, 336
(1999) (suggesting that transfer factors are reformed for minors charged with
murder).
207. Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Jus-
tice: In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 267,
280 (1991).
208. For a further discussion of broad and narrow constructions courts have
adopted, see supra notes 124-64 and accompanying text.
209. See Arteaga, supra note 186, at 1081-85 (calling for uniformity in federal
system to decrease disparate treatment in waiver hearings). "[L]egislative gui-
dance should come in the form of a well defined uniform standard .... This
legislative guidance will also help prevent the disparate treatment of similarly situ-
ated juveniles during transfer hearings." Id. at 1081.
210. See id. at 1081 (suggesting greater guidance for federal waivers through
"a list of clearly defined and prioritized factors"); see also Zinring & Fagan, supra
note 38, at 416 (suggesting balancing transfer standards between rule-oriented sys-
tem and discretionary factors).
211. See Arteaga, supra note 186, at 1083 (noting that lack of uniform stan-
dards increases likelihood of disregarding amenability of juvenile to rehabilita-
tion). "This legislative guidance will minimize the disparate treatment of similarly
situated juveniles and the risk that youth amenable to treatment will be trans-
ferred." Id. at 1088.
212. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective
on Jurisdictional Boundary, in CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 38, at 386 (noting that
due process standards for adults may not be adequate in juvenile proceedings). See
generally id. at 379-404 (discussing developmental perspective and culpability of
juvenile offenders).
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adjudicated conduct to be admitted for consideration under any of the six
factors.2 13 By adopting a streamlined, uniform construction, district court
judges would still have the individual discretion to waive jurisdiction, but
significant variations in the resulting decisions would be eliminated.
214
VII. CONCLUSION
As Congress increasingly targets youth violence and federalizes more
crimes, federal courts will undoubtedly see an increase in the number of
discretionary judicial waivers to the criminal justice system. 215 Further-
more, the way in which judges make waiver decisions is of the utmost im-
portance because of the devastating effects a waiver to the criminal system
may have on a youth. 2 16 As the system currently stands, juveniles face a
system that could potentially undermine fundamental legal principles be-
cause of conflicting interpretations of the FJDA's discretionary judicial
waiver factors, specifically "prior delinquency record."2 17 Adopting a uni-
form standard is imperative for evaluating which juvenile cases should be
properly waived to the criminal justice system and which should remain in
juvenile court.2 18 If Congress only enacts harsher new punishments for
juvenile offenders without further delineating the factors that judges are
to apply in waiver decisions, the future of the federal juvenile justice sys-
213. For a further discussion on why the best method is to admit only prior
adjudicated conduct into evidence, rather than all prior police contacts, see supra
notes 165-203 and accompanying text.
214. See Zimring & Fagan, supra note 38, at 414-15 (discussing problem of
legislative reforms that do not address specific juvenile justice problem). The au-
thors argue thatjuvenile justice professionals should play a large role in the legisla-
tive process by guiding the prospective new legislation. See id. at 415 (advocating
legislative policy reform with help of outside experts). Currently, legislation re-
sponds to the public's perception of a general threat ofjuvenile violence. See id. at
414 (noting that public mood crafts legislative responses to youth violence).
215. For further discussion on increasing federalization of crimes and the ris-
ing importance of the FJDA, see supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
216. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 113, at 254-61 (discussing youth offend-
ers in juvenile and criminal court systems). The effects of being a youth in an
adult criminal setting influence thejuvenile's attitudes, behaviors and post-release
perceptions. See id. at 254 (providing overview of impact on youth from organiza-
tional settings). Furthermore, prison misconduct is most common among younger
inmates, and the prison setting reinforces violent behavior in juveniles. See id. at
257-58 (noting that prison inmates endorse violence for "survival" while incarcer-
ated). Youths imprisoned with adults often feel less able to handle the predatory
environment and are at the greatest risk for physical and sexual assaults. See id. at
258-59 (describing victimization of juveniles in criminal justice system).
217. For a further discussion of the circuit split over the meaning of FJDA
waiver factor "prior delinquency record" as well as potential problems arising from
discrepancies in interpretation, see supra notes 124-203 and accompanying text.
218. See generally Zimring & Fagan, supra note 38, at 407-24 (providing over-
view of policy lessons and suggestions that may be learned from various juvenile
transfer theories, statistics and cases).
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tern is bleak. 219 On the other hand, hope remains for juveniles facing a
discretionary waiver; congressional reform aimed at refining waiver factors
would decrease the broad discretion district court judges hold, therefore,
creating a system more in line with the original Progressive philosophy to
save those juveniles capable of being saved.220
Jessica L. Anders
219. See id. at 416 (commenting on need to strike balance between rule-based
policy and discretion). The authors note:
But the choice in transfer policy is not between overbreadth and law-
lessness. The right kind of standards for transfer are those that create the
necessary conditions for transfer eligibility... A rule orientation can pro-
vide the necessary conditions for transfer to criminal court without gener-
ating needless expulsion from juvenile court, but rules cannot provide
the sufficient conditions for transfer without overbroad transfers as an in-
evitable result.
If the legislative process is best restricted to generating the necessary
conditions for transfer, legislation must delegate the power to decide in
individual cases either to judges or prosecutors.
Id.
220. See S. 1735, 108th Cong. (2003) (detailing proposed juvenile crime legis-
lation that would increase the federal role in juvenile adjudications). For a further
discussion of the Progressive movement ideology, see supra notes 21-41 and ac-
companying text.
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